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Abstract. The emergence of distributed ledger technology (DLT) based upon a 
blockchain data structure, has given rise to new approaches to identity management 
that aim to upend dominant approaches to providing and consuming digital identi-
ties. These new approaches to identity management (IdM) propose to enhance de-
centralisation, transparency and user control in transactions that involve identity in-
formation; but, given the historical challenge to design IdM, can these new DLT-
based schemes deliver on their lofty goals? We introduce the emerging landscape 
of DLT-based IdM, and evaluate three representative proposals – uPort, ShoCard 
and Sovrin – using the analytic lens of a seminal framework that characterises the 
nature of successful IdM schemes. 
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1 Introduction 
Twenty-four years have passed since Peter Steiner first showed the world that “on the 
Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog”, yet that famous drawing still stands to illustrate 
the challenge to identify individuals online. Today, we are very far from the public 
directory vision of the inventors of public-key cryptography in the seventies or the 
grand scheme of hierarchical certification envisaged in the eighties. Identity manage-
ment (IdM) on the Internet still relies on what Cameron [1] called a decade ago a 
“patchwork of identity one-offs” comprising several types of IdM systems that are re-
stricted to specific domains and do not interact much with each other. Centralised mod-
els of IdM currently face challenges due to the increasing regularity of data breaches 
that lead to reputation damage, identity fraud, but above all a loss of privacy for all 
concerned. These recurring events highlight a lack of control and ownership that end-
users experience with their digital identities [2]–[4]. 
The investigation of alternative approaches to IdM is being led by initiatives that 
seek to expand the trustworthiness and reach of digital forms of identity. The United 
States’ National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) aims to accel-
erate the development of novel technologies that can increase trust in online transac-
tions [5]. Also, ID2020 seeks to leverage emerging digital technologies to expand the 
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 reach of legal identities (mirroring the United Nations’ goals to “provide [by 2030] 
legal identity for all, including birth registration” [6]). The emergence of Bitcoin [7] 
has also inspired fresh thinking about digital identity due to its underpinning distributed 
ledger technology (DLT) not needing a central authority to validate transactions of its 
native cryptocurrency. Thus, a globally decentralised network is able to reach 
consensus on the current state of its book of transactions, the “ledger”. The distributed 
ledger itself is an append-only shared record of transactions that is maintained by en-
tities on a peer-to-peer network; while the often-cited “blockchain” is a cryptographic 
data structure often employed in DLT that is constructed through successive crypto-
graphic hashing of blocks of transactions. 
Given that DLT is suited to assuring consensus, transparency, and integrity of the 
transactions that it contains, a number of benefits of applying DLT to IdM have already 
been proposed: 
– Decentralised – Identity information is referenced in a ledger that no single central 
authority owns or control. 
– Tamper-resistant – Historical activities in the DLT cannot be tampered with and 
transparency is given to all changes to that data. 
– Inclusiveness – New ways to bootstrap user identity can be conceived that expand 
the reach of legal identities and reduce exclusion. 
– Cost saving – Shared identity information can lead to cost savings for relying par-
ties along with the potential to reduce volume of personal information that is repli-
cated in databases. 
– User control – Users cannot lose control of their digital identifiers if they lose ac-
cess to the services of a particular identity provider/broker. 
But, given these proposed benefits of incorporating DLT into future IdM schemes, is 
the path to new forms of DLT-based IdM really “inevitable” [2]? 
2 Identity management on the blockchain? 
Identity Management (IdM) encompasses the processes and policies involved in man-
aging the lifecycle of attributes in identities for a particular domain [8]. Most IdM 
schemes today are centralised where a single entity controls the system. However, the 
generated identities themselves can be federated beyond a single organisation, as when 
governments issue national identity cards. In federated identity systems, users can use 
identity information established in one security domain to access another. Single sign-
on schemes, such as Facebook Connect, can work this way. User-centric identity man-
agement places administration and control of identity information directly into the 
hands of individuals. Examples include password managers (e.g., 1Password, Less-
Pass) that securely keep track of different website credentials. 
Despite the different approaches, one function that is fundamental to IdM is securely 
binding together an identifier: a value that unambiguously distinguishes one user from 
another in a domain; and attributes (sometimes called certifications or claims): entitle-
ments or properties of a user such as name, age, credit rating etc. The first steps taken 
to tailor the use of DLT for establishing a secure and decentralised identifier-attribute 
mapping were taken in the design of Namecoin: the longest surviving software fork of 
 Bitcoin. Namecoin provides a human-readable, decentralised and secure namespace for 
the “.bit” web domain. This achievement contradicted conventional wisdom that a nam-
ing system exhibiting all three characteristics could not be designed [9]. Blockstack [4] 
has extended Namecoin’s scheme, to create a decentralised public key infrastructure 
(PKI): it registers bindings between a public key and a human readable identifier.  
Recently, several decentralised identity schemes have emerged that extend beyond 
naming and aim to provide a more complete suite of IdM functions. However, until 
now, there has been no evaluation of these proposals. We were interested in whether 
DLT-based IdMs have potential to go beyond previous approaches, or would simply 
create new “identity one-offs”. 
2.1 Approach 
We started our inquiry by searching for blueprints of DLT-based IdM proposals that 
were technically scrutable (e.g., white papers, open source software, etc.). We excluded 
schemes that only provided naming and found that all fell into one of two categories: 
1 – Self-sovereign Identity: an identity that is owned and controlled by its owner with-
out the need to rely on any external administrative authority and without the pos-
sibility that this identity can be taken away. It can be enabled by a decentralised 
identity eco-system that facilitates the recording and exchange of identity attrib-
utes, and the propagation of trust among participating entities. Examples include 
Sovrin, uPort and OneName; 
2 – Decentralised Trusted Identity: an identity that is provided by a centralised service 
that performs identity proofing of users based upon existing trusted credentials 
(e.g. passport), and records identity attestations on a DLT for later validation by 
3rd parties. Examples include ShoCard, BitID, ID.me and IDchainZ. 
In this paper, we focus on three particular DLT-based IdM schemes: uPort, ShoCard, 
and Sovrin. We chose these three schemes in particular because individually they serve 
as key exemplars of the prevalent design decisions and challenges found in their re-
spective genres, and together serve a similar purpose for the broader landscape of DLT-
based IdM. In addition, they have provided the most technical detail of their scheme 
designs and are either underpinned by sizeable online communities or have notable 
venture capital funding. 
There is no definitive criterion to evaluate IdM schemes, so in order to generate early 
insights about individual schemes we leveraged an evaluation framework known as the 
“laws of identity” [1] which serve to pinpoint the successes and failures of digital iden-
tity systems. It is a widely-known framework, and represents a full spectrum of IdM 
concerns, encompassing security, privacy and user experience. Furthermore, the laws 
provide an inherent flexibility, which is ideal for application to the heterogeneous and 
early-stage DLT-based IdM schemes we evaluated. The laws themselves are as follows: 
1 – User control and consent – Information that identifies the user should only be 
revealed with that user’s consent. 
2 – Minimal disclosure for a constrained use – Identity information should only be 
collected on a “need-to-know” basis and kept on a “need-to-retain” basis. 
 3 – Justifiable parties – Identity information should only be shared with parties that 
have a legitimate right to access identity information in a transaction. 
4 – Directed identity – Support should be provided for sharing identity information 
publicly or in a more discreet way. 
5 – Design for a pluralism of operators and technology – A solution must enable 
the inter-working of different identity schemes and credentials. 
6 – Human integration – The user experience must be consistent with user needs and 
expectations so that users are able to understand the implications of their interac-
tions with the system. 
7 – Consistent experience across contexts – Users must be able to expect a consistent 
experience across different security contexts and technology platforms. 
In the text that follows, where we refer to a specific law, we use bracket notation to 
reference the law number (e.g., (1), (5)). 
3 uPort 
uPort [3] is an open source decentralised identity framework that aims to provide “de-
centralised identity for all”. Its use case is IdM for next generation decentralised appli-
cations (DApps) on the Ethereum DLT and for traditional centralised applications such 
as email and banking. 
3.1 Design 
A uPort identity is underpinned by the interactions between Ethereum smart contracts: 
bespoke code that can regulate the movement of data and ether (the native cryptocur-
rency) on Ethereum. Smart contracts are uniquely addressed by 160-bit hexadecimal 
identifiers, and, when invoked are executed by the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) 
installed on every Ethereum node. Two smart contract templates designed by uPort 
comprise each uPort identity: controller and proxy. To create a new identity, a user’s 
uPort mobile application creates a new asymmetric key pair and sends a transaction to 
Ethereum that creates an instantiation of a controller that contains a reference to the 
newly created public key. Then, a new proxy is created that contains a reference to the 
address of the just-created controller contract; only the controller contract can invoke 
functions of the proxy; a constraint that is specified in the controller and enforced by 
the EVM. The address of the proxy comprises the unique uPort identifier (uPortID) of 
a user. A user is free to create multiple uPortIDs that are unlinkable. Figure 1 provides 
an overview of an interaction between a uPortID and the smart contract of a decentral-
ised application on Ethereum. 
The private key that controls a uPortID is stored only on the user’s mobile device. 
Therefore, an important aspect of uPort relates to its social recovery protocol for the 
event of loss or theft of the user’s mobile device. For that, users must nominate the 
uPortIDs of trustees who can vote to replace the public key referenced in the controller 
with one proposed by the user in need; once a quorum is reached between those trustees 
 on the new public key, the controller replaces the lost public key with the newly pro-
posed public key. This process enables the user to maintain a persistent uPortID even 
after the loss of cryptographic keys. 
A final aspect of the uPort scheme is its support for securely mapping identity attrib-
utes to a particular uPortID. The uPort registry is a smart contract that stores the global 
mapping of uPortIDs to identity attributes. Any entity can query the registry, however, 
only the owner of a specific uPortID can modify its respective attributes. Due to the 
inefficiency of storing large volumes of data in a smart contract, only the hash of the 
JSON attribute structure is stored in the registry. The data itself is stored on IPFS: a 
distributed file system where a file can be retrieved by its cryptographic hash. 
3.2 Analysis 
uPort has no central server and does not authenticate the owner of a uPortID; this passes 
the risk of unauthorised access to the local authentication methods on the user’s mobile 
device. While the social recovery protocol provides one method to recover ownership 
of a lost or compromised uPortID, the trustees themselves could be one vector of attack 
since their own uPortIDs are openly linked to the user’s uPortID; this transparency 
provides opportunities for collusion against a specific uPort user. If an attacker can 
compromise a uPort application and replace trustees unnoticed via the controller, the 
uPortID is compromised permanently. So while uPort does place more control over 
uPortIDs in the hands of its users – a plus for (1) – a layer of added complexity and 
responsibility is inevitably handed to users. 
uPort does not require personal data disclosures to bootstrap an uPortID for a con-
strained use and also respects privacy in terms of the lack of inherent linkability be-
tween uPortIDs (2). However, the registry (if used) represents a point of centralisation 
that can be probed for information about identifiers and identity data. So while specific 
attributes within the attribute data structure can be individually encrypted, the overall 
JSON data structure is still visible which could leak meta-data about specific attributes 
or relationships with identity providers/relying parties. Thus there is a chance that over-
reliance upon the registry can compromise privacy (3). 
A commerce application can widely advertise its uPortID, but uPort provides no 
public directory to look up uPortIDs from arbitrary search criteria. Discreet disclosure 
of a uPortID is possible if a user creates new uPortIDs for each new relying party that 
they encounter and avoids the use of the registry (4). Although, since a uPortID equates 
to a smart contract, an honest but curious Ethereum node could discover even non-
disclosed uPortIDs through analysis of the smart contract code stored at a given address 
to determine if it is a uPort template. More work is needed to discover whether non-
disclosed uPortIDs are private in practice. 
uPort does not perform any identity proofing but instead provides a framework for 
users to gather attributes from an eco-system of trust providers; uPort simply specifies 
the format of attributes that are stored in its registry. But as a consequence of the uPor-
tID owner alone having write-access to their own respective part of the registry, a user 
can selectively discard negative attributes that they are given e.g. a poor credit score 
etc. (5). 
 The mobile application of uPort provides a consistent user experience across all us-
age contexts (7) due to the scanning of a QR code to initiate interactions with a relying 
party. However, the in-app education is not present relating to the implications of put-
ting representations of personally identifiable information on a DLT designed to prior-
itize immutability and transparency of data (6). The area of user education will become 
pressing in this context as legislation such as European General Data Protection Regu-
lations (GDPR) come into force in Europe. 
 
Figure 1: An overview of key elements of uPort: a user identity is comprised of a mobile 
application and two smart contracts: controller and proxy. The registry is a smart contract 
that provides a decentralised mapping of uPort identifiers to identity attributes. The regis-
try can be globally read, and can reference data stored in an off-DLT data store such as 
IPFS. 
4 Sovrin 
Sovrin [2] is an open-source decentralised identity network built on permissioned DLT. 
Sovrin is public, but only trusted institutions, called stewards – which could be banks, 
universities, governments, etc. – can run nodes that take part in consensus protocols: 
thus the ledger is permissioned. The non-profit Sovrin Foundation ensures the proper 
governance of the stewards and their respect of a legal agreement called the Sovrin 
Trust Framework. Sovrin provides the code-base to the Hyperledger Indy project. 
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 4.1 Design 
Sovrin enables a user to generate as many identifiers as needed to keep contextual sep-
aration of identities for privacy purposes; each identifier is unlinkable and controlled 
by a different asymmetric key pair. Sovrin identifiers themselves are managed by the 
user or an appointed guardian service, and follow the Decentralised Identifier (DID) 
specification currently seeking IETF standardisation. A DID is a data-structure con-
taining the user identifier, cryptographic public key and other meta-data necessary to 
transact with that identifier. 
The Sovrin architecture can be summarised by the components as shown in Figure 2. 
The key element is the Sovrin ledger. This contains transactions  associated with a spe-
cific identifier and is, written, distributed and replicated among the steward nodes, 
which run an enhanced version of the redundant Byzantine fault tolerant protocol of 
Aublin et al. [10], called Plenum, for consensus. 
There are two important consequences to the choice of permissioned ledger in Sov-
rin’s design. First, no expensive proof-of-work computation is required to reach con-
sensus on the state of the ledger, reducing significantly the energy cost of running a 
node and improving dramatically transactions throughput. Second, trust on Sovrin re-
lies on both people and code. Trust starts from the common root-of-trust formed by the 
globally distributed ledger, but as new organisations and users join the network, they 
can become trust anchors (i.e. allowed to add more users and organisations); a “web of 
trust” is expected to evolve to support this decentralised network growth. 
Users interact with Sovrin through a mobile application and control software agents 
acting on their behalf to facilitate interactions with other agents on the network. Agents 
are network endpoints that are always addressable and accessible. Users could run 
agents on their own servers, but more likely, they will ask specialised intermediaries: 
agencies, to do that for them, alike e-mail systems. Agents also provide a backup ser-
vice and encrypted storage of attribute credentials. 
The mobile application also helps users manage cryptographic keys, which are stored 
on the users’ mobile device. As in uPort, Sovrin offers a mechanism for key recovery 
that relies on the user selecting a set of trustees. When requested to do so by the user, a 
specified quorum of trustees must sign a new identity record transaction that stewards 
must verify. 
4.2 Analysis 
Sovrin aims to equip users to fully control all aspects of their identity. Each user can 
select from the attribute credentials that they hold about themselves, which they wish 
to share with a relying party (1). This is made possible through the use of anonymous 
credentials. Although users can choose to store those attributes on the ledger, in general, 
they will prefer to use the storage capabilities of their mobile phone or their agent to 
transmit attributes to other parties through secure communication channels, and use the 
ledger to identify the correct network endpoint to use. The use of attribute-based cre-
dentials allows users to only reveal credentials that they choose (2). Verifying the party 
with whom data is shared, remains a challenge, which is partly addressed through the 
 web-of-trust, the governance of the Sovrin Foundation and the reputation of the stew-
ards. 
Although there are no trusted third parties in the PKI-sense on Sovrin, users must 
rely on agencies that will act on their behalf on the Sovrin network and on the stewards 
maintaining the ledger. Depending on the choice of agent and its implementation, a lot 
of information could potentially be in the hands of the agency. However, as agencies 
are acting on behalf of the user, they have a “necessary and justifiable place” in the 
identity relationship (3). 
Sovrin supports both omnidirectional and unidirectional identifiers (4): public or-
ganisations can decide to publish their full identity on the network, while users may 
choose to publish only identifiers and to use different identifiers and cryptographic key-
pairs with each party they interact with, avoiding emitting “correlation handles”. 
Today, Sovrin depends on a very small number of operators sharing the same imple-
mentation. As the systems gets traction, new agencies, and new stewards, will join. The 
Sovrin Foundation expects in particular to build a market of agencies that will compete 
on the features they offer, for instance interfaces with other (existing) identity sys-
tems (5). 
Finally, one important issue not yet addressed by the Sovrin developers, is the user 
experience. The history of security offers several examples of smart cryptographic sys-
tems, which have never been deployed widely because users found it too cumbersome 
or difficult to understand – email encryption using PGP is a seminal example. So, hu-
man integration remains an open question for Sovrin. Considering that Sovrin is still in 
the early development phase, evaluating it against laws (6) to (7) is tricky, but it is 
illustrative that much work has considered the design of the scheme architecture itself, 
but hardly any has considered the user experience. 
  
Figure 2: An overview of key elements of Sovrin. At the base of Sovrin is a permissioned 
ledger. Only stewards that legally abide by the Sovrin Trust Framework can write to the 
ledger. Users and organisations rely on agents that are addressable network points. Identi-
fiers, keys and endpoint addresses are stored on the ledger. 
5 ShoCard 
ShoCard [11] provides a trusted identity that leverages DLT to bind a user identifier, 
an existing trusted credential (e.g., passport, driver’s license), and additional identity 
attributes, together via cryptographic hashes stored in Bitcoin transactions. ShoCard’s 
primary use cases are verification of identity in face-to-face as well as online interac-
tions. 
5.1 Design 
ShoCard uses Bitcoin as a timestamping service for signed cryptographic hashes of the 
user’s identity information, which are mined into the Bitcoin blockchain. ShoCard in-
corporates a central server as an essential part of its scheme; this server intermediates 
the exchange of encrypted identity information between a user and a relying party. The 
scheme relies on three phases: bootstrapping, certification, and validation. Figure 3 
schematises those phases. 
Bootstrapping occurs at the creation of a new ShoCard. The ShoCard mobile appli-
cation generates a new asymmetric key pair for the user and scans their identity cre-
dentials using the device’s camera. The scan and the corresponding data are encrypted 
and stored on the mobile device; the signed hash of this data is also embedded into a 
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 Bitcoin transaction for later data validation purposes. The resulting Bitcoin transaction 
number constitutes the user’s ShoCardID and is retained in the mobile application as a 
pointer to the ShoCard seal  
Once a ShoCard is bootstrapped, the user can interact with identity providers to 
gather additional attributes in a process called certification. In order to associate certif-
icates to a ShoCardID, an identity provider must first verify that the user knows both 
the data hashed to create it, and the cryptographic keys that signed the seal. In a face-
to-face context, this can be achieved by the user providing the original identity data 
forming the seal from their mobile device, a digitally signed challenge and presenting 
the original trusted credential. The certificate takes the form of a signed hash of new 
attributes (and its associated ShoCardID) in a Bitcoin transaction created by the pro-
vider. The provider must share the Bitcoin transaction number along with a signed 
plaintext of the new attributes directly with the user. Since the user will later need to 
provide the attributes to relying parties and may not want to lose them if the mobile 
device is lost, a ShoCard server offers storage for encrypted version of certifications 
(known as an envelope). ShoCard never learns the encryption key, which enables the 
user to share certifications only with selected parties. 
The validation phase occurs when a relying party must verify a certification to de-
termine whether a user is entitled to access a service (e.g. has checked in to a flight). 
To validate the envelope the user must first provide the relying party with the envelope 
reference and its encryption key. After retrieving the envelope from the ShoCard serv-
ers, the relying party performs a number of checks: i) that the envelope signature was 
produced with the same private key that signed the seal; ii) that the certification signa-
ture was created by a trusted entity and the plain-text certification corresponds to the 
one hashed and signed in the certification; iii) finally, that the identity data presented 
by the user in the pending transaction match those signed and hashed in the seal. 
5.2 Analysis 
The ShoCard central server functions as an intermediary to manage the distribution of 
encrypted certifications between ShoCard users and relying parties. In this way, Sho-
Card bears less risk of data breach than if it stored and distributed plaintext identity 
data. Secure storage of identity information and appropriate sharing with relying parties 
is controlled by the end-user (1). However, ShoCard’s intermediary role does create 
uncertainty about the longitudinal existence of a ShoCardID; if the company ceased to 
exist, users of ShoCard would be unable to use the system with the certifications they 
had acquired. This makes ShoCard more centralised in practice than its open reliance 
on DLT might suggest.  
Each ShoCard identity is bootstrapped with an existing trusted credential, such as a 
passport or driving license. Such an approach may require users to embed more per-
sonal information in their ShoCard seal than they had originally intended. This may 
make ShoCard less attractive for low value online accounts (2). 
Since the user is in control of initiating sharing activities, and since ShoCard only 
stores encrypted data, there can be some confidence that only justifiable parties are 
involved in the identity data sharing transaction. However, the ShoCard server may be 
 able to associate a particular ShoCardID with a particular relying party, since envelopes 
must be retrieved from ShoCard server by the relying party (3). 
ShoCard only supports unidirectional identifiers and does not have the concept of a 
public registry of ShoCardIDs. Although omnidirectional identifiers may be needed in 
future to realise its vision of an eco-system of reusable certifications (4). 
ShoCard does support a multitude of different identity providers through its certifi-
cation functionality, but those providers must create bespoke integration with Sho-
Card’s own web services in addition to Bitcoin, which could be a barrier to uptake. The 
decision to perform such integration could be driven by the trustworthiness of Sho-
Card’s identity proofing of its users (5). 
The scanning of identity documents and QR codes is a dominant interaction para-
digm in the ShoCard user experience: it is simple and consistent (7). However, it is 
unclear what the user motivations would be to adopt this new type of digital identity, 
and how users would be educated about the implications of referencing identity data on 
a blockchain (6). Users are also not supported with cryptographic key management. 
One final point concerns the overall deployability of ShoCard. Bitcoin transactions 
take on average 10 minutes to be mined into the blockchain, and furthermore it is rec-
ommended to wait for six additional blocks to be mined before assuming the settlement 
of a transaction. This could bring the waiting time for settlement to one-hour on aver-
age. If a context that depends upon real-time settlement of certifications, this speed 
could create challenges for the user experience and adoption by vendors. 
 
Figure 3: An overview of key elements of ShoCard. ShoCard uses Bitcoin to record a com-
mitment to personal data that was verified during identity proofing, and for storage of 
hashes of certifications that build upon the user’s Seal created by relying parties. The Sho-
Card server plays an active role as an intermediary between users and relying parties. 
6 Discussion 
Table 1 summarizes each scheme that we evaluated with respect to each law of identity. 
An unshaded table cell indicates that we found evidence that suggests a scheme com-
plied with a specific law, and a shaded cell indicates that we didn’t find evidence that 
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6.1 Decentralisation that relies upon centralisation and intermediaries 
DLT is often seen as a remedy for system architectures dominated by central authorities 
and intermediaries. But while each DLT-based IdM scheme we looked at leverages 
techniques of decentralisation to different degrees, this served mainly to reshape the 
role of centralisation and intermediaries, rather than to eradicate them. For example, 
uPort’s registry stores a secure mapping between uPortID and their attributes and also 
relies upon central authorities as trust providers for identity attributes; the ShoCard 
central server is an intermediary that stores encrypted identity attributes and mediates 
between end-users and relying parties. Sovrin on the other hand embraces an open eco-
system of intermediaries (e.g., agencies, trust anchors). 
So, while DLT applications often target the removal of the “middle man”, this may 
not be a realistic goal in IdM applications due the context of identity maintaining a 
profound need for trust. Of course, this need for centralisation and intermediaries is not 
necessarily a bad thing: there are numerous examples of centralisation and intermedi-
aries serving essential functions in an industry (see e.g., the SWIFT network). Elements 
of needed centralisation or intermediation in a decentralised IdM may comprise: 
– Capturing additional authentication factors from end-users; 
– Backing-up and recovering cryptographic keys; 
– Providing a secure namespace to facilitate lookup of entities and services; 
– Storing securely the information hash pre-images needed to validate digital signa-
tures; 
– Recovering compromised DLT-based identities. 
The case of “The DAO” stands as an example of the risks of pursuing too much decen-
tralisation in a system design. The DAO was designed as an Ethereum smart contract-
based autonomous venture capital company but a flaw in its underlying code enabled 
an attacker to steal $50 million of the funding that it collected [12]. The research chal-
lenge for DLT applications in IdM is therefore to explore the balance between central-
isation and decentralisation to create interoperable and privacy-respecting IdM that mit-
igates the risk of placing too much trust in any single authority. 
6.2 Envisioned eco-systems of shareable identity attributes – but ad hoc trust 
Support for the creation and sharing of identity attributes certified by 3rd parties is a 
design feature of each scheme we evaluated. In ShoCard, 3rd parties can certify attrib-
utes of an identifier; uPort and Sovrin support both self-attestation of attributes and 
those assigned by other entities. 
Designing for reusable identity attributes aims to improve the granularity at which 
users can disclose identity information and promotes reuse of attributes. However, due 
to the lack of a central authority, trust of these attributes currently relies upon ad-hoc 
trust establishment between organisations. ShoCard and Sovrin propose a “web of 
 trust” as the means by which attributes can be trusted. However, the challenges to de-
sign a web-of-trust are widely known where the network size is unbounded: difficulty 
to quantify trust beyond a first-degree relationship especially if any entity can vouch 
for any other, poor density of trust anchors on the network, lost or expired private keys, 
slow propagation of endorsement between users, etc. DLT does not address any of those 
challenges, but future research could focus on methods to achieve the building of trust 
and reputation between entities in the context of DLT identity attributes. This could be 
one way that DLT-based IdM responds to NSTIC [5] and delivers new interoperability 
in IdM. 
6.3 If it isn’t usable it isn’t secure 
Dhamija’s explains in her “7 flaws of identity management” [13] that for users “identity 
management is not a primary goal”. This has been reflected in the shrug that users have 
largely given to single-sign on solutions: the main user-facing proposition of IdM. This 
suggests that future IdM schemes with a novel technological underpinning but devel-
oped to the same blueprint of end-user interaction are unlikely to create widespread 
uptake. A principal tenet of human-computer interaction is to design systems based 
upon concrete knowledge of problems faced by end-users. So far we have seen that the 
schemes we evaluated are generally not accompanied by a novel vision of user interac-
tion, and furthermore leave the perennial challenge to provide usable end-user key man-
agement [14] as largely unaddressed. Recent research has suggested that key manage-
ment remains to be a principal source of concern for users of Bitcoin [15]. While the 
promising concept of key recovery was proposed in uPort and Sovrin, approaches to 
digital identity that remove central authorities and depend upon effective key manage-
ment strategies from its users create the risk that non-technical users will be alienated 
by the technology; and when things go wrong those users will be unable to recover 
resources or reputation attached to lost keys. 
7 Concluding remarks 
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) is not a silver bullet solution for Identity Man-
agement (IdM). Our application of Cameron’s evaluative framework provides an early 
glimpse of the current strengths and limitations of applying DLT to IdM. Future work 
in this nascent research area faces two particular hurdles: 
Firstly, there is a noticeable lack of contextual understanding relating to the user 
experience elements of the schemes we encountered. Usability is a particularly pressing 
unknown since there appears to be a widespread assumption that users are equipped to 
conduct effective cryptographic key management, and would intuitively understand the 
implications of referencing identity data or attributes in a DLT.   
Secondly, a tightening regulatory landscape for storing personal data. For example, 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) grants end-users new powers over per-
sonal data, and places new obligations upon data controllers. This creates a challenge 
for the design of immutable public ledgers that reference personal data, and that provide 
inherent transparency to data that they store.  
 Delaying the advance of new approaches to secure and trusted identities on the In-
ternet was said to be an unacceptable course of action by the United States’ NSTIC 
strategy [5]. This might be due to the concern that the online adage that “on the block-
chain, nobody knows you’re a fridge”, may soon replace the prescience of Steiner’s 
original cartoon.
 Table 1: A summary of uPort, ShoCard, Sovrin, and their relation to Cameron’s laws of identity.  Facebook Connect is provided for comparison. An unshaded table cell indicates that we found evidence that 
a scheme complied with a specific law, and a shaded cell indicates that we currently see no evidence that a scheme complies with a specific law. 
 
Law uPort ShoCard Sovrin Facebook Connect 
1 – User control and 
consent 
User controls creation and disclosure of uPor-
tIDs and can prove ownership of uPortID with-
out a central authority. But attributes stored in 
registry may leak information. 
User controls creation and disclosure of ShoCar-
dIDs. Attributes are only accessible to a relying 
party by invitation of ShoCardID owner. But, 
ShoCard servers are necessary part of attribute 
validation protocol. 
By design, users can choose which IDs are used 
and which attributes are revealed. A web of trust 
that could be reinforced by a reputation system 
helps protect users against deception. 
Today, when using Facebook to log on to a ser-
vice the user can choose which data will be 
shared by Facebook with the relying party. 
2 – Minimal disclosure 
for a constrained use 
Users do not need to disclose personal data in 
order to create uPort identifiers for low value ac-
counts. 
ShoCardIDs are bootstrapped with a trusted 
identity document (e.g., a government ID). 
Support of anonymous credentials based on 
zero-knowledge proofs allows users to share the 
information “least likely to identity [them] 
across multiple contexts” [1]. 
A user can create an empty Facebook profile and 
progressively add identity information as is 
needed. 
3 – Justifiable parties 
The JSON structure of attributes in the registry 
is visible to all, which may leak information to 
an honest-but curious attacker – even if en-
crypted. 
ShoCardID only revealed to a relying party at 
the invitation of the ShoCardID owner. ShoCard 
servers may learn identity of relying parties. 
Attributes are only accessible to relying parties 
that the user chooses, and to the agencies en-
trusted to act on their behalf. 
Facebook always has access to the data stored on 
a user’s Facebook profile whether the data is 
public or private. Facebook also creates and pro-
cesses its own attributes e.g. relationships with 
friends. 
4 – Directed identity 
Supports unidirectional sharing of identifiers be-
tween parties, but does not prevent entities 
broadcasting identifiers out of band e.g. on web-
sites. 
Supports unidirectional sharing of identifiers be-
tween parties, but does not prevent entities 
broadcasting identifiers out of band. 
Omnidirectional identifiers are supported. Omnidirectional identifiers are supported. A 
user’s Facebook profile can be made public or 
private and profiles can be searched. 
5 – Design for a plural-
ism of operators and 
technology 
Agnostic to the types of attributes that 3rd party 
identity providers create, yet use of a specific 
data format is encouraged in the registry. 
Supports parsing of existing trusted credentials 
but relying parties must create bespoke integra-
tions with ShoCard centralised servers for attrib-
ute validation. 
Expects to build a market for intermediaries 
(agencies) between users and the Sovrin net-
work. Some could be interfaces with other iden-
tity systems. 
Only one identity provider: Facebook. Uses a 
bespoke method for authorisation to applica-
tions. But, Facebook has nearly 2 billion users. 
6 – Human integration 
Provides a mobile application. Social crypto-
graphic key recovery function shows promise. 
Unclear usability and user understanding of 
uPort privacy implications.  
Provides a mobile application. The digital ID 
card metaphor is easy to understand. Unclear us-
ability and user understanding of ShoCard pri-
vacy implications.  
Implementation has been targeted so far towards 
the underlying technology, not the user experi-
ence. Unclear usability and user understanding 
of privacy. 
Facebook is well known to users and usable in-
terface to single-sign is provided. However, us-
ers may be unaware of privacy implications of 
Facebook Connect. 
7 – Consistent experi-
ence across contexts 
User interaction driven by the mobile applica-
tion. Consistently follows a QR code scanning 
paradigm for all uses. 
User interaction driven by the mobile applica-
tion. Consistently follows a QR code scanning 
paradigm for all uses. 
Not clear. This will highly depend on the market 
of implementations of mobile device clients for 
the Sovrin network. 
Consistent and experience via the ‘login with Fa-
cebook’ button. 
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